Peter Tatchell urges aid to the anti-Saddam opposition to enable them to make their own democratic revolution.
Democracy is supposed to be a system where different points of view are debated. In the course of debate, the pros and cons of each perspective are analysed and critiqued. Then, after assessing the various options, a decision is taken.
This didn’t happen on the issue of war with Iraq. Democracy was cut short. Only two simplistic, back and white points of view were considered – pro-war and anti-war. The possibility of more complex, sophisticated options were never given any serious thought, let alone parliamentary debate.
The left is just as guilty as the government. We let Tony Blair get away with his false claim that to remove the Butcher of Baghdad there was no alternative to a US and UK invasion. The Prime Minister won the battle of public opinion, partly because the left had no answer to his jibe: how would you end Saddam Hussein’s tyranny?
The left’s failure to offer a credible alternative to invasion contributed to the disastrous situation where, once the war began, nearly 60 per cent of the population backed the military campaign. These were not all gullible Blairites and right-wing war-mongers. Many supported the war because they felt sincere compassion for the suffering of the Iraqi people under Saddam’s murderous regime. They wanted to end the dictatorship. Their desire was just and noble. The catch phrase of the anti-war movement – “Don’t attack Iraq” – ignored these humanitarian concerns, and is a major reason why the Stop the War campaign lost ground even before the outbreak of hostilities.
For decades, the left supported the anti-Saddam opposition. Suddenly, faced with the threat of a US and UK invasion, it turned its back on the struggle for socialism, democracy and human rights in Iraq. The Stop The War leaflets rightly demanded “Freedom for Palestine”, but they shamefully omitted any mention of “Freedom for the Iraqi people”. Why?
Opposing the western attack on Iraq and supporting the Iraqi resistance to Saddam are not mutually exclusive. In fact, the latter complements the former. A strong internal opposition is the best way to ensure that a post-Saddam Iraq will not be ruled by a US-imposed puppet regime.
Empowering anti-Saddam Iraqi socialists and democrats should, surely, be part of the left and anti-war agenda? Both politically and ethically, we ought to have supported their struggle for regime change. It was always the most likely way to free the Iraqi people from Saddam’s despotism, while also thwarting US plans to transform Iraq into a pro-western client state.
Despite the barbarism of the Ba’athist regime, there can be no justification for the current neo-imperial occupation of Iraq. This is a twenty-first century version of nineteenth century gunboat diplomacy. But disguised as ‘liberation’. If Tony Blair and George Bush really cared about the suffering of the Iraqi people, why didn’t they give the Kurds, Shias and other opposition movements the weapons they needed to overthrow the Ba’athists?
The US and UK won’t arm the anti-Saddam opposition because they fear an internal democratic revolution might result in an independent-minded government that may not do the West’s bidding.
As one of the world’s worst human rights abusers, the Iraqi leader had to go. There can be no toleration of a tyrant who murders and maims. But western invasion was never the right way to bring about regime change. Overthrowing the dictatorship from within, by empowering the Iraqi opposition to liberate themselves, was always the preferable option.
In the April issue of Red Pepper magazine, Mary Kaldor outlined a number of methods by which Saddam might have been toppled “without war”. All have some virtue, but none were really convincing.
There was, for example, considerable merit in the idea of lifting the generalised sanctions, which mostly punish ordinary Iraqis, and replacing them with smart sanctions that target Saddam and his ruling elite. Freezing their overseas assets and banning them from travelling abroad, would have hurt. But it would not have bought down the regime. The same weakness applies to UN weapons inspectors and human rights monitors. Although valuable, these measures were never likely to seriously undermine the dictatorship.
A more credible option is the proposal to put Saddam and his senior officials on trial in The Hague, on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, torture and war crimes. This would involve the UN setting up a Special Tribunal, along the lines of those established to deal with human rights abuses in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.
There is, however, a major difficulty with this proposal: enforcement. Once leading Ba’ath party officials were indicted, the Special Tribunal would face the problem of how to enforce the indictment. Saddam and his entourage were never going to travel willingly to The Hague to stand trial.
There was only one plausible way to get them there: send undercover SAS-style snatch squads into Iraq to arrest and kidnap the Ba’athist leadership. Although this would have been risky and difficult, the rescue of American PoW Jessica Lynch suggests it might have been possible. Providing Saddam’s seizure was authorised by the UN Special Tribunal and he was taken to the international court in The Hague (as opposed to being unilaterally grabbed by the US and tried in an American court), this would have been a great victory for the international human rights movement. It would have ended Saddam’s rule, and signalled the beginning of the end for the many other dictators who currently think they are untouchable.
Even now, if Saddam and his henchmen are eventually captured, the left and anti-war movements should be backing this option of putting him on trial for war crimes.
An even better strategy for deposing Saddam would have been a ‘people power’ democratic revolution, like they had in the Philippines and Romania in the 1980s. A campaign of popular protest and civilian resistance could have seriously undermined Saddam’s ability to govern, weakening his authority and strengthening the Iraqi people’s confidence that he could be overthrown. This resistance could have included workplace go-slows, mass sick leaves, industrial and military sabotage, and the non-payment of rents and taxes. These tactics were used with some success by the Danes to frustrate the Nazi war effort during the Second World War, by the Indian independence movement to end British colonial rule, and by black South Africans to make apartheid unsustainable.
But given Saddam’s ruthless repression, civilian resistance alone may not have been sufficient. An armed uprising might have been necessary to get rid of Saddam and the Ba’athist apparatus of repression.
The Kurdish and Shia opposition movements have large, but poorly equipped, armies. In early April, their commanders made renewed pleas for more and better weapons. Blair and Bush ignored their cries, and so did the left.
Whatever happened to internationalism? Why did we do nothing to help the Iraqi people achieve their own home-made democratic revolution?
As an alternative to western invasion, the left could have campaigned for military aid to the anti-Saddam resistance inside Iraq. During the 1940s, Britain armed Tito’s partisans and America armed Ho Chi Minh’s guerrillas. If US and UK aid to democrats and socialists fighting tyranny was an acceptable left campaign during the Second World War, why not now?
Home-grown regime change by Iraqis and for Iraqis is the key to democracy, human rights, self-determination and regional peace. Why did the left and anti-war movements allow Bush and Blair to get away with the false claim that invasion was the only option? Why did they turn their backs on the victims of Saddam’s tyranny?
Faced with dictators like Saddam, progressives have previously backed armed insurrections by the partisans in Nazi-occupied Europe, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the ANC in South Africa, and Fretilin in East Timor. Why didn’t the left support arming the Iraqi resistance, to enable them to liberate their own country?
War is ghastly, even revolutionary war inspired by the high ideals of liberty and justice.
But faced with a ruthless dictatorship like Saddam’s – where the possibility of peaceful, democratic change is non-existent – armed insurrection is, regrettably, often the only effective option. We cannot sit back and do nothing. The Iraqi people were crying for help to secure their freedom. Terrorised by the Ba’athists, they needed weapons, not sympathy.
A left campaign for military aid to the Iraqi opposition would have answered Blair’s knock out question: what would you do to get rid of Saddam? It would have allowed socialist and other progressive activists to offer a clear, credible alternative to western invasion. That might have helped stop the haemorrhaging of public opposition to the US and UK attack on Iraq.
Military aid to the anti-Saddam resistance could have been highly effective. Remember the aid given by Russia and China to Vietnam? If the Vietnamese can defeat the mightiest military power in history then, surely, with a little military aid from the international community, the Iraqi people could have defeated Saddam?
The Kurds have 70,000 troops, and the Shias 15,000. The Iraqi Communist Party has underground members with guerrilla experience from previous attempted uprisings. All these opposition forces were desperate to take on Saddam, but they needed better weapons: artillery, tanks, mortars, helicopter gun-ships, and anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. The West sold Saddam the weapons he uses to murder his people. Shouldn’t we have helped redressed the balance by arming his victims so they can fight back?
Compared to western invasion, a domestic insurrection would have been far more popular with the Iraqi people. Fiercely nationalistic, they understandably dislike the idea of a US-imposed regime, where they are treated like pawns with no say in their own destiny.
As for the future: The current US and UK occupation of Iraq could yet turn into a Northern Ireland-style terrorist nightmare that drags on for years. The capture of Iraqi cities by the allied armies may not be the end of the war. Saddam loyalists could regroup into small, covert units that wage hit-and-run ambushes, using sniping, car bombs, mines and booby-traps. Allied forces could also eventually find themselves on the receiving end of bullets and bombs from anti-Saddam nationalists who resent the occupation of their country by foreign armies.
There is already evidence of an anti-US and anti-British backlash, provoked by the killing of innocent civilians during the aerial bombardments and by trigger happy marines at road checkpoints. The destruction of the water, electricity and phone systems has further inflamed public hostility, as did the initial refusal of allied troops to control looting and protect hospitals, museums and schools. Worst of all, in the eyes of Iraqis, has been the American and British imposition of unpopular pro-western tribal and clerical leaders as local administrators, some with connections to the Saddam regime.
Gulf War 2 may have sowed the seeds for Gulf War 3: an Iraqi war of national liberation against the occupying armies of Britain and America.
* Peter Tatchell is the author of Democratic Defence (Heretic Books/GMP, 1985) www.petertatchell.net